Why the name ‘Credo’?

‘Credo’ is a Latin term which means "I believe". It is the first word of many creedal statements and has come to form part of two renowned Latin phrases. The first, ‘credo quia absurdum est’ (‘I believe because it is absurd’), is a modern reformulation of Tertullian's paradox. It has been commonly affiliated with the philosophical theologian Kierkegaard (d.1855). The second phrase is the words of Anselm of Canterbury (d. 1109), ‘credo ut intelligam’ (‘I believe in order that I may understand’), based on St. Augustine’s (d.430) statement, “crede, ut intelligas” (‘believe so that you may understand’).

Both Kierkegaard and Anselm have gained recognition for epitomising and representing these phrases respectively, in ways they thought corresponded to what was meant to them. Inasmuch as this gave rise to scholarly variations of how the phrases were epitomised and represented, so too were their variations in how they were received.

The former phrase seems to be received in a Fideist sense. Fideism is defined as a reliance upon faith in establishing and accepting religious truths as opposed to reason, which is either secondary or entirely dispensable. As for the latter phrase, Anselm’s words imply that faith or belief is required in order to make sense of religious truths. This meant that reason on its own would fail to make any intelligible sense about God and depends on a prior act of faith or belief. He famously went on to state, “I do not seek to understand in order that I may believe, but I believe in order that I may understand (credo ut intelligam). For this I also believe; that if I did not believe, I could not understand.” (Anselm, Proslogion).

Notwithstanding the contributions of the theological and philosophical import of such religious perspectives, both phrases give primacy to faith over reason.

However, the very analytic inquiry that this account of faith or belief is subject to is not immune from an application of the same kind of analytic inquiry to itself. The content is given to the terms ‘faith’ and ‘belief’, in such circumstances, would only carry philosophical import and consequently, be subject to philosophical scrutiny. While such an inquiry would equally generate conceptual questions which would appear to legitimately scrutinise such matters of faith and belief, the criteria of meaning by which it qualifies its questions as being adequate is the same criteria of meaning it attempts to impose upon its religious interlocutor. Furthermore, the religious interlocutor’s relationship with God is not analytic in nature, but religious and spiritual. What such an inquiry does achieve is to show philosophically that in the absence of such an external criterion of meaning, any attempt to justify or scrutinise matters of faith and belief would end up as a vicious regress of self-referentiality.

In the Islamic theological tradition, Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), a Hanbilite scholar, similarly criticised the people of falsafa (philosophers) and kalām (theologians) by attacking their criteria for a definition (al-Radd, p. 49-55). Ibn Taymiyya held that the meanings of words arise from the context in which they are used, without which words are meaningless. Arguably then, it is only by embodying the context of faith and belief can one make sense of religious truths.

To embody the context of faith means to worship God because of who God is in and of Himself. This refers to God as one worthy of worship and not because His existence can be justified with the types of conventional evidence offered in (analytic) philosophy, or otherwise. In fact, Ibn Taymiyya’s reservation with the mutakallimūn was that they regarded God’s worship as a subsequent obligation to prove His existence using rational and demonstrative proofs (Majmū’, 2, 10-11). For Ibn Taymiyya, the first obligation is the belief of God’s sole worthiness to be worshipped (tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya) because to worship God is precisely how God’s existence is to be acknowledged (Majmū’, 2, p.7).

To believe then is to confess to the limits of human reason. In fact, the believers (muʾminūn) are described in the Qurʾān as being believers of the unseen (ghayb), to which the human mind does not have access. In the famous creed of Imām Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭaḥāwī (d. 321/933), he divides knowledge into two kinds: accessible and inaccessible (al-Ṭaḥāwiyya, p. 536-7). Laying a claim to inaccessible knowledge leads to errors in faith. To demonstrate, the fundamental doctrine of God’s decree (qadr) requires one to believe that knowledge of it belongs exclusively to God. The attempt to rationalise God’s knowledge of the past, present and future with God’s bestowal of free will to human beings is where the error lies. It is as though the laborious task to reconcile the two to ensure God’s infinite knowledge is not compromised is required because God is in need of our explanation. However, a believer rests in God, and she is calm in the knowledge that all is God’s will.

Similarly, attempts to reconcile evil and suffering in the world with God’s infinite power and goodness suggest that God’s ways are according to how human beings understand them. However, the believer confesses that God is unlike human beings, and His ways are beyond human intelligibility as outlined in the Qur’ānic verse: “There is nothing like unto Him” (42:11).

An acknowledgement of the limits of human reason is captured in the aphorism of Ibn ʿAṭāʾillāh, the renowned Sufi saint, in which he says, “Where were you when His special concern and care took charge of you? There was no sincerity in actions in His pre-eternity (azalihī) nor the presence of spiritual states.” The response of silence to the rhetorical question is precisely confessing to the finite nature of reason in comparison to the infinite nature of God (God’s knowledge).

Although religious faith and belief may enjoy intellectual assistance (be it philosophical or otherwise) in specific instances that prove to be amenable to its fundamental doctrines, it can also express its deeply-rooted convictions without being compelled to offer such types of conventional evidence. It should bear this right of intellectual unconventionality without being stigmatised as anti-intellectual. In fact, the types of evidence religion does offer, which is not considered conventional by the criteria of contemporary philosophy, cannot be trivialised as unintelligible. Religion need not obligate its follower to substantiate matters of faith and belief by conformist methods. However, being able to sustain an accurate balance between variations of substantiation (without entirely intellectualising religious belief) and upholding such convictions in the absence of any corroboration, is where the difficulties lie.  

This is where CREDO steps in. CREDO anticipates investing serious amounts of endeavour in addressing such religious dilemmas. It envisions overcoming conformist attitudes and mindsets predominantly generated by social and intellectual paradigms that are responsible for the religious decline. CREDO is primarily dedicated to enriching and preserving the Islamic faith by shifting social and intellectual paradigms.

CREDO is committed to: 

Preserving the faith of all Muslims

1.     To manifest the utility of faith from a number of different aspects.

2.     To remove all possible obstacles for the people of faith in being able to continue to uphold their faith in a contented manner regardless of all influencing factors.

Enriching the faith of all Muslims

1.     To create a global atmosphere where faith is a positive phenomenon.

2.     To ensure faith does not become a peculiar or eccentric phenomenon.